



Sir, good morning


What we have for you today sir, are recommendations for the distribution of MNC-I enablers that will support 3ID.


~~SECRET//REL to USA, MCFI, IRAQ//MR~~

Agenda


- 2 Meetings with MG Buk
  - "I have enough people; just need more equipment". Was promised 24 UAH 1114 ... (b)(6) said that there is no shortage of HWWMV and MG Buk can expect them by 1 September.
  - It would help greatly if the new helicopters (Updated HIND W3 model, night capable) could be transported to CAMP DELTA instead of TALLIL. AVIM and test fire capabilities are located at DELTA.
  - If there is an option, it would be better to get them as soon as possible ...ie. 18-20 August. That way, MND-CS would have its own AWT (4 attack helicopters).
  - They will get additional ISR with the ORBITER in September
  - Approved concept of operations; scheme of maneuver
  - Understands that he might have to wait until Phantom Strike is complete before gaining enabler support, but wants to begin Phase III Stage A as close to 1 September as possible.
  - Do we want to deploy a corps TAC to Diwaniyah for this operation? Will we send additional corps planners to augment LNO section?
  - Consider tasking MND-C to provide an infantry battalion TF with 3 rifle companies and 1 mechanized co/tm. The mech/stryker/tank capability would be very useful.

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*TAO Thunderbird* 

- Temporary Area of Operations Thunderbird is divided into 4 sectors.
- TAO Thunderbird has 3 corps-designated phase lines: Aluminum, Bronze, and Copper



1.4c

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**Phase III, Stage A**

- Yellow area is considered cleared
- Aqua area depicts first area to be cleared
- Clearing will be done by 1.4b Iraqi, and US forces
- IP will hold combat security outposts created by TF Engineer
- TF Engineer / TF Reserve

1.4c

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**Phase III, Stage B**

- Orange area will be cleared in Stage B
- Clearing will be done by 1.4b Iraqi, and US forces
- IP will hold combat security outposts created by TF Engineer
- TF Rear/Reserve

1.4c

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Phase III, Stage C


- Red area will be cleared in Stage C
- Clearing will be done by 1.4b Iraqi, and US forces
- IP will hold combat security outposts created by TF Engineer
- TF Rear/Reserve

1.4b

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**Phase III, Stage D** 

- Blue area will be cleared in Stage D
- Clearing will be done by 1.4b Iraqi, and US forces
- IP will hold combat security outposts created by TF Engineer
- TF Rear/Reserve

1.4c

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**Phase III, Stage E**

- Purple area will be cleared in Stage E
- Clearing will be done by 1.4b Iraqi, and US forces
- IP will hold combat security outposts created by TF Engineer
- TF Rear/Reserve

1.4c

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## Concept of Support

1.4c

**Current Population:** 2,213

**Fuel:** Approx 7k day (31D plan factor)  
70% storage JP8: 124K CF: 10.6K/day  
70% storage DF2: 224K CF: 9.9K/day  
70% storage MG: 12K CF: 368G/day

**Arm:** 82<sup>nd</sup> SB and IN BN FSC sustains the RST and US Forces (50 container storage cap)

**Fix:** 82<sup>nd</sup> SB and IN BN FSC provides MST

**Move:** TMR's assigned to 82<sup>nd</sup> SB and coordinated via log synchronization for delivery at Echo.

**Sustain:** Pushed from 82<sup>nd</sup> SB, supply point distro by 1.4b and IN BN FSC

CL II: 45 total containers, 1700 pallets  
BW/MRE/Hallal meals capacity  
BULK WATER: Produce/issue 115K daily  
CL I Ice: 500 5lb bags / day  
CL I DFAC: 6x RFR every 5 days  
CL IV CSO PKG 1-20 complete 10 SEP  
TCP complete 16 SEP

**PSS:** Mail delivery via 82<sup>nd</sup> SB.

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1. Sir, this is our concept so far.

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## **PHANTOM HAMMER**

### **Combined Planning Session #3**

30 July 2007

**PURPOSE:** To continue combined planning in order to develop the plan for OPERATION PHANTOM HAMMER

This briefing is classified

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Derived from: Multiple sources  
DECL ON: 30 July 2017

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Sir, good morning

What we have for you today sir, are recommendations for the distribution of MNC-I enablers that will support 3ID.

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**Agenda** 


- Introductions / meet and greet
- Keys to success
- Intelligence Update
- Operational Update
  - Review Mission, Intent, Concept of Operations
  - Identify Key Tasks by Phase
- Review proposed scheme of maneuver
- Discuss enablers to assist operations
  - Information Operations
  - Public Affairs
  - Logistics
  - Fires
  - Military Police
  - Civil-Military Operations
  - Engineers
- Questions, issues, meet with counterparts
- Conduct reconnaissance of TCPs; security stations


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<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MGFI, IRAQ//MR</del>		<b>IGFC, MNC-I, and MND-C Attendees</b>	
<div>(b)(3), (b)(6)</div>	MNC-I, C3 Plans	Lead Planner	
	MNC-I, C3 Fires	Fires and Effects Planner	
	MNC-I, PMO	Military Police Planner	
	MNC-I, PAO	Public Affairs Planner	
	MNC-I, C4	Logistics Planner	
	MNC-I, IO	IO Planner	
	MNC-I, C9	Civil-Military Planner	
	MNC-I, C2	Intelligence Planner	
	MNC-I Reconciliation		
	IGFC Advisor		
	IGFC, G5		
	IGFC, G3		
	IGFC Interpreter		
	MND-C Liaison	Lead Planner	
	MND-C		
MND-C			
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*Keys to success*

- Iraqi Police
  - Continue to collect biometric data
  - Re-blue and train Iraqi Police
  - Vett Iraqi Police leadership
- Iraqi Army
  - Additional forces required to conduct operation Phantom Hammer
- MND-CS
  - Offensive minded; able to clear and occupy combat security outposts
- C7
  - Coordinate Engineer support to build TCP; combat security outposts
- Capitalize on success in Ramadi, Fallujah
  - Population control
    - Ingress, Egress, barriers, biometrics
- Information Operations

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*Situation*


- The removal of several MJAM personnel in Diwaniyah has created a power vacuum
- Reports of new identities making a play for power
- Lull in attacks gives MJAM the opportunity to rearm and prepare defenses
- Core problem in Qadisiyah is with the rate of unemployment and illiteracy
- People need to have hope for their future
- Industries have to energized and investment obtained
- Impossible to do with
  - a weak government and corrupted IP
  - political parties and splinter groups contending for power using violence,
  - political differences and personal reprisals
  - external influences working against success
- Can the tribes bring a positive influence to regain stability?

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**Situation** 


■ Diwaniyah is the capital of Qadisiyah Province. The city is located approximately 150 KM south of Baghdad and 55 KM east of Najaf. The city's estimated population is 400,000 and is comprised of 99% Shi'a. DIWANIYAH IS THE CAPITAL OF QADISIYAH PROVINCE. THE CITY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 150KM SOUTH OF BAGHDAD AND 55KM EAST ON NAJAF. THE CITY'S ESTIMATED POPULATION IS 400,000 AND IS COMPOSED OF 99% SHIA. LESS THEN 1% OF THE POPULATION IS SUNNI OR OTHER. DIWANIYAH IS EASILY RE-SUPPLIED WITH WEAPONS AND FUNDING FROM THE SURROUNDING CITIES OF NAJAF, AFAK, BUDAYR, HAMZAH, SHAMIYAH, AND NASIRIYAH. THE CITY IS AN IMPORTANT LOGISTICS HUB FOR JAYSH AL MAHDI (JAM) MEMBERS TRAVELING TO AND FROM BAGHDAD. THE CITY ALSO SERVES AS A WAY-POINT FOR 1.4b

1.4b AS IT IS LOCATED WITHIN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE HOLY CITIES OF NAJAF AND KARBALA WHICH ARE CONSIDERED SAFE AREAS. DIWANIYAH IS OFTEN REVERED AS A HOLY CITY ITSELF AND THE OFFICE OF THE MARTYR SADR ALONG WITH THE QADISIYAH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAVE LOBBIED FOR THE REMOVAL CF FROM THE CITY. PILGRIMS pass through Diwaniyah enroute to Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. The next pilgrimages are on 9 August 2007 ain Baghdad to commemorate the death of the 7<sup>th</sup> Imam, 29 August 2007 in Karbala and Najaf to celebrate the birthday of the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam, and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 2007 in Najaf for the injury and death of Ali.

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## Enemy Situation




■ THE PRIMARY THREAT WITHIN THE OPERATION PHANTOM HAMMER AREA (A.K.A. GREATER DIWANIYAH IN QADISIYAH PROVINCE) IS MILITANT JAM, OR MILITANT (MJAM). IT IS ASSESSED THAT THERE ARE 1,500 MJAM MEMBERS IN DIWANIYAH, SOME OF WHICH ARE PURPORTED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL IRAQI POLICE FORCE. PRIOR TO 4 JULY 07, MJAM HAD MORTARED CAMP ECHO WITH IMPUNITY; THOUGH NOT GENERALLY MORE THAN A FEW HARASSMENT ROUNDS PER NIGHT. HOWEVER, ON 2 JULY 07, A TOTAL OF 81 107MM ROCKETS AND MORTARS BOMBARDED CAMP ECHO. DIWANIYAH HAS BECOME A RECRUITMENT AREA FOR MJAM AND A PROVING GROUND FOR TRAINEES NEWLY RETURNED FROM 1 4b. DIWANIYAH IS A WAYPOINT OR HUB FOR SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS (INCLUDING EFPS) AND FUNDING OF SHI'A MILITANTS. LOCAL RESIDENTS ARE INTIMIDATED BY MJAM THROUGH DEATH THREATS AND MURDER. THE POOR AND UNEDUCATED POPULACE OF DIWANIYAH WILL SUPPORT THE ENTITY THAT CAN BRING SOCIAL SERVICES AND STABILITY. AFTER THE MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACK OF 2 JUN 07, SOF STRIKES KILLED AND WOUNDED KEY MJAM LEADERS WITHIN DIWANIYAH. THIS ACT EMBOLDENED SOME CITIZENS AGAINST MJAM THUG ELEMENTS; MJAM LEADER AL GRAYTI WAS WOUNDED IN THAT SOF ATTACK AND IS REPORTED TO HAVE LEFT THE CITY. DURING OPERATION BLACK EAGLE, MJAM LEADERS FLED DIWANIYAH AND OPERATED OUTSIDE THE CITY. MJAM COMMAND STRUCTURE WAS ONLY PARTLY DISRUPTED FROM BLACK EAGLE AND ON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION MJAM MEMBERS MOVED BACK INTO THE CITY. MJAM RETAINS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT 60% OF DIWANIYAH (ASKARI, NAHDA, WAHDA, JUMURI DISTRICTS). MJAM USED THE 19 MAY "RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT" TO REST, REARM, AND REFIT FORCES IN DIWANIYAH - NEW SHIPMENTS OF WEAPONS WERE DELIVERED INTO DIWANIYAH; THERE ARE SUSPECTED EFP PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN DIWANIYAH WITH LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO 1 4b.

■ THE CURRENT SITUATION IN DIWANIYAH REMAINS CALM BUT TENSE. THE ENEMY HAS CONTINUED WITH SPORADIC HARASSING FIRE OF FOB ECHO WITH LITTLE EFFECT. RECENT CJSOF OPERATIONS HAS CAUGHT MJAM OFF GUARD AND RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT LEADERSHIP LOSSES WHILE OTHER MJAM LEADERS HAVE FLED THE CITY FEARING AN IMPENDING CF OPERATION. IN SPITE OF OMS IO CAMPAIGN TO BLAME THE CF FOR VIOLENCE, REPORTS CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT MANY IN THE LOCAL POPULATION BLAME MJAM FOR THE INSTABILITY IN DIWANIYAH. THE ABSENCE OF JAM LEADERSHIP HAS LED TO SOME REPORTED INFIGHTING AND HAS ALSO PROVIDED A VACUUM THAT BADR AFFILIATES ARE LOOKING TO FILL.

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## Current Situation


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- Reports of new identities making a play for power
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## Putting MJAM off balance



For maximum impact to Diwaniyah's JAM organization, Abu Assem must be removed in conjunction with Kifah Al Greyti and Ali Al Hadad, the three of whom form the backbone of Diwaniyah JAM operations. If only Abu Assem is removed, expect Kifah Al Grayti (and Ali Al Hadad behind him) to re-establish their presence and assume complete control over Diwaniyah within weeks. Kifah Al Grayti and Ali Al Hadad appear to be even less affected by Baghdad/Najaf guidance than Abu Assem, and their leadership will result in more extreme levels of violence as they assert their dominance. If only Kifah or Ali Hamza is removed, JAM will be intimidated and destabilized, but Abu Assem will prevent JAM from entirely losing structural integrity and JAM will eventually regain strength.

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(b)(6)

1.4b





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(b)(6)


(b)(6) is a Diwaniyah JAM Battalion Commander who along with (b)(6) reports directly to (b)(6). He has been reported to lead the Al Haq Battalion and is responsible for many of the IDF and EFP attacks on Coalition Forces. Although b 6 seems to dominate when the two are together, (b)(6) takes the lead when (b)(6) is away/injured. This was evident after b 6 was wounded in recent clashes with CF. (b)(6) was also reported to be severely wounded, however he stayed in Diwaniyah and managed JAM activities in (b)(6) absence.

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What will the Governor do when we conduct an operation?





- The Governor will do his best to make us look bad/place the blame on us and arrange meetings with militia leaders to broker 'truce accords' that will demand that CF (quite possibly ISF too) never come in the area again.


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	<p><del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCFI, IRAQ/MR</del></p> <p>Where will MJAM run to?</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Ash Saniyah is a JAM hide out, approximately 90% of the town supports JAM. <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 5px;">b 6</span> has a house there and spends a lot of time in the area. However, if he feels threatened he will run further then Saniyah.</li><li>■ He went all the way to Suwayrah during BE I.</li><li>■ <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 5px;">b 6</span> spent BE I hiding in Daggharah with most of his top guys.</li><li>■ The rest should go to Najaf, Afak, Budayr and Hamza</li><li>■ If we leave these areas open for them to run to then once Diwo is as secure as can be expected we can flex to these areas and secure them later.</li><li>■ Assuming that the CF forces are staying here then these areas should not be difficult to deal with after Diwo.</li></ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCFI, IRAQ/MR</del> 23</p>		

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What tactics will MJAM employ?




- MJAM will employ IED's.
- Most intersections on good paved roads in the JAM areas will have IED's.
- All the IED's have sniper and/or RPG over watch. MJAM usually start a contact with an IED followed by sniper fire/ SAF to delay us while other JAM forces maneuver on us.
- MJAM don't try to take terrain from us but will work to get the angles from buildings to pin us down.
- Once MJAM get into a fight that they want to escalate they will rally at a platoon leader's house and receive orders on where to go. They break up into 2 – 3 man teams and look to take corner houses.
- MJAM will use windows and stay a few feet back into the room to conceal their location. Our TTP for that is once we ID a building that we are taking fire from we lock it down with 50 cal and then fire an AT 4 or Carl G into a window.

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
Additional Tactical Intel 


- MJAM have an extensive early warning network in town and the surrounding areas.
- We can not leave the FOB without them knowing.
- IA and IP radios are possibly compromised so OPSEC awareness on the radio will be a priority.
- Maneuvering in the city difficult because IED's will be planted ahead of you if they figure out where we are going.
- MJAM block a lot of the side streets to channel forces into IED's or dead ends.
- The key to this being a success is cleaning up the IP and re-trained.

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JAM will maintain its presence in the northern and eastern part of the city and will try to spread influence on other districts. AIF will be not able to attack CF ISF permanently but we can expect that separate IED IDF attacks will be performed. Snipers activities is expected. Main aim of AIF will be to achieve bigger influence on local structure like provincial council or IP. In case of CF reaction key leaders of the JAM will escape from the city and will be operating outside the city. The others will continue their hostile activities avoiding general confrontation with CF/ISF.

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*Operational Update  
Facts*

- "Reconciliation Agreement" signed on 19 May greatly reduced ISF effectiveness.
- There is limited confidence amongst IA and IP within Diwaniyah
- Currently only 1 x BN from Iraqi Army (1/1/8) in Diwaniyah
- IP unwilling to fight against MJAM - IA has limited its activities against militia inside the city
  - IP restructuring process not yet complete
  - IP are militia-influenced and intimidated
  - IP has insufficient junior-level leaders and have equipment and training shortages
- MND-CS ability to deal with current situation independently is limited
  - MND-CS lacks maneuver units, enablers
- MND-CS Shadow coverage is 3 hours per day
  - Older version of Shadow; based out of Camp Delta; takes 1 hour each way to get into the fight from Delta to Echo

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**Key Tasks** 


- Phase I
  - Write and Issue Orders
  - Conduct Reconnaissance
  - Conduct Backbrief
- Phase II
  - Establish TCPs
  - Gather Intelligence
  - Conduct Biometrics
  - Conduct Rehearsals
  - Stockpile Supplies
  - Conduct Movement
- Phase III
  - Clear Hayys
  - Establish Combat Security Outposts
- Phase IV
  - Regain Control of Diwaniyah
  - Civil Military Operations
    - (MEDCAP, food distribution, fuel, jobs, factories reopening, clean-up)

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*MNC-I Mission Statement from 07-01*





- MNC-I conducts combat and stability operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transition responsibilities to the ISF in order to reduce violence, gain the support of the people, stabilize Iraq, and enable GOI security self-reliance. NLT December 2007, we will establish improved stability and create irreversible momentum, leading to wide-ranging political accommodation and sustainable security by Spring 2009 and to the ultimate goal of self-reliance in the longer term.

*MNC-I Mission Statement for Phantom Hammer*


- On order, in coordination with Iraqi Security Forces, MNC-I clears the Hayys of Northern Diwaniyah to neutralize militant Jaysh Al Mahdi (MJAM) and secure the populace, in order to stabilize Qadisiyah province and return Diwaniyah to legitimate GOI control.


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	<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MGFI, IRAQ//MR</del>	<b>Operational Update Commander's Intent</b>	
<b>■ PURPOSE</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Reestablish Iraqi Security Force control of Diwaniyah</li><li>■ Enhance security within the MND-CS operational environment</li></ul>			
<b>■ KEY TASKS</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Establish a Joint Planning Cell consisting of MNC-I, MND-C, MND-CS, CJSOTF, IGFC, and 8th IA staff to develop a CONOP for operations vicinity Diwaniyah.</li><li>■ On order, deploy MND-C combat forces to a Combined Temporary Area of Operations inside MND-CS IOT posture for operations IVO Diwaniyah.</li><li>■ On order, conduct clearing operations within the city of Diwaniyah IOT kill or capture extremists and neutralize AIF threat to MND-CS stability.</li><li>■ Reinforce existing and/or establish new long-term CF and ISF security stations within Diwaniyah to prevent the reemergence of extremists.</li></ul>			
<b>■ END STATE</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Extremists IVO Diwaniyah neutralized</li><li>■ ISF (supported by MND-CS forces) in control of Diwaniyah with conditions set for civil military operations</li><li>■ Stability restored in the MND-CS operational environment</li><li>■ MND-C forces redeployed to the MND-C operational environment.</li></ul>			
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*Operational Update*  
*Concept of Operations*

■ MNC-I WILL REINFORCE MND-CS AND ISF WITH ADDITIONAL GROUND COMBAT POWER AND CORPS ENABLERS IN VICINITY OF CAMP ECHO IN ORDER TO CLEAR DIWANIYAH OF ENEMY FORCES AND ENHANCE SECURITY WITHIN THE MND-CS OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. ON ORDER, A CORPS PLANNING TEAM WILL DEPLOY TO CAMP ECHO TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS..ON ORDER, MND-C WILL DEPLOY 1 X INFANTRY BATTALION TASK FORCE TO DIWANIYAH IN VICINITY CAMP ECHO IN ORDER TO CLEAR ASSIGNED SECTOR WITHIN TEMPORARY AREA OF OPERATIONS THUNDERBIRD. OPERATION PHANTOM HAMMER IS A FOUR-PHASED OPERATION AS DESCRIBED BELOW:

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*Operational Update  
Concept of Operations*


■ **PHASE I: PLANNING.** (CURRENTLY ONGOING). DURING PHASE I, MNC-I PREPARES A CONPLAN TO DEPLOY SUFFICIENT FORCES TO A TEMPORARY AREA OF OPERATIONS IVO DIWANIYAH TO CONDUCT CLEARING OPERATIONS TO REESTABLISH ISF CONTROL OF THE CITY AND ENHANCE SECURITY WITHIN THE MND-CS OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. MNC-I C3 PLANS HOSTED A PLANNING CONFERENCE WITH ISF, MND-CS, MND-C, AND CORPS STAFF TO ASSIST IN THE INTEGRATION OF CORPS ENABLERS, COALITION FORCES, AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES INTO COURSES OF ACTION FOR OPERATION PHANTOM HAMMER. MNC-I PLANNERS CONDUCTED A COMBINED PLANNING SESSION AT CAMP ECHO ON 21 JULY 2007 WITH THE INCOMING 1.4b CHIEF OF STAFF AND PRIMARY STAFF. AT THIS TIME, THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WAS CONFIRMED BY MND-CS. MG BUK, THE INCOMING CG FOR MND-CS, REQUESTED ANOTHER PLANNING ITERATION AT CAMP ECHO; CORPS PLANNERS, IGFC OFFICERS, AND MND-C WILL TRAVEL TO DIWANIYAH ON 29 JULY 2007 FOR A SECOND PLANNING SESSION. PHASE I ENDS WHEN CONPLAN IS BRIEFED TO THE CG, MNC-I.

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*Operational Update  
Concept of Operations*

■ **PHASE II: SET THE CONDITIONS.** (CURRENTLY ONGOING). MNC-I WILL INCREASE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS THROUGH INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIONS. MNC-I COORDINATES THE COLLECTION EFFORTS OF CORPS AND MSC ISR ASSETS TO ESTABLISH A BASELINE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN DIWANIYAH. CORPS DEVELOPS TARGET PACKETS WITH COLLECTION PRIORITIES BEING HVI, OTHER MJAM LEADERSHIP, SAFE HOUSES, HISTORICAL TRAINING SITES, AND EARLY WARNING NETWORKS. MND-C WILL COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH MND-CS AND CJSOTF TO COLLECT ON MJAM REACTIONS TO CF OPERATIONS IN AND NEAR DIWANIYAH AND TO DEVELOP TARGET PACKAGES FOR KINETIC STRIKES AND SEARCH AND ATTACK OPERATIONS IN PHASE III. FEINTS, RAIDS AND LIMITED STRIKES MAY BE EXECUTED DURING THIS PHASE TO PROVOKE ENEMY ACTION TO FACILITATE COLLECTION AND TO DESTROY SPECIFIC TIME SENSITIVE TARGETS, BUT SHOULD BE LIMITED IN NATURE TO AVOID CAUSING MJAM TO DISPERSE BEFORE CLEARING FORCES ARE PREPARED. UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CJSOTF-AP NEAR SIMULTANEOUS INTENSE AIR, INDIRECT, AND/OR GROUND PRECISION STRIKES WILL BE CONDUCTED TO DESTROY KEY TARGETS IDENTIFIED DURING PHASE I, DISRUPT MJAM, AND SET CONDITIONS FOR 8TH IA DIV, MND-C AND MND-CS TO CONDUCT CLEARING OPERATIONS IN DIWANIYAH. PHASE II ENDS WHEN CG, MNC-I DIRECTS MND-C TO EMPLOY FORCE TO DIWANIYAH.

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■ **PHASE III: DECISIVE OPERATIONS.** (NET 15 AUG 07). MND-C WILL DEPLOY TO TOA THUNDERBIRD AND CONDUCT CLEARING OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO REESTABLISH IRAQI SECURITY FORCE CONTROL OF DIWANIYAH AND ENHANCE SECURITY WITHIN THE MND-CS OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. 1.4b INFANTRY UNITS WILL ALSO CLEAR A SECTOR OF DIWANIYAH. THE MAIN EFFORT FOR PHANTOM HAMMER IS THE 8TH IA DIV; THEY WILL CLEAR THE TIRE FACTORY AND SOUTHEAST DIWANIYAH. PHASE III ENDS WHEN ALL HAYYS NORTH OF THE RIVER IN DIWANIYAH ARE CLEARED, ALL DISCOVERED CACHES DESTROYED, ALL TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS ARE ESTABLISHED AND MANNED, AND ALL IRAQI POLICE SUB-STATIONS (COMBAT SECURITY OUTPOSTS) ARE CONSTRUCTED AND MANNED.

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
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
*Operational Update*  
*Concept of Operations*

■ **PHASE IV: SUSTAIN SECURITY.** CONTROL OF DIWANIYAH IS RETURNED TO THE ISF, MND-C FORCES REDEPLOY TO MND-C OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AND MND-CS OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IS SECURE. MND-C WILL RETAIN LIAISON WITH MND-CS TO FACILITATE COORDINATION AND SYNCHRONIZE FIRES AND EFFECTS. CJSOTF ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OF DIWANIYAH. TF 1.4a WILL CONTINUE PROVIDING AIR WEAPONS TEAMS AT KALSU IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO MND-CS UNTIL END OF MISSION.


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
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**Operational Update**  
**Mission Analysis**

- **Sustainment**
  - 82<sup>nd</sup> SB provides area support
- **Command and Control**
  - Camp Echo has sufficient communications to control increased CF operations
- **Intelligence**
  - Additional intelligence assets will support operation Phantom Hammer
- **Firepower**
  - 2 x 155mm Paladin, FDC, Q36 radar augments MND-CS
  - 2 x AWT provides direct support to operations in Diwaniyah
  - Begin biometrics immediately to register Iraqi Police in Diwaniyah
- **Maneuver**
  - Three Battalions required to clear TAO Thunderbird in an 18-day operation
  - Separate (larger) force MUST hold cleared ground (Iraqi Police)
- **Protection**
  - Must create JSS-like structures after clearing operations are complete
  - Must create Traffic Control Points to stop flow of weapons into Diwaniyah


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Sir, good morning

What we have for you today sir, are recommendations for the distribution of MNC-I enablers that will support 3ID.

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**FACTS**


- **8IA has:**
  - **1x Field Engineer Company**
    - 2x33T Cranes
    - 10x Dump Trucks
    - 2XExcavators
    - 10xDozers
  - **1x Bomb Disposal Company (BDC – has EOD capability).**
  - **The Engineer company does not have body armor for soldiers.**
  - b 6 has requested training on cranes and engineer expertise on

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**FACTS**

- **US has several units capable of completing building COPs. BOGs listed:**
  - 131th CSE – 28 Sep (MND-B)
  - 642d ESC – 1 Nov (MND-B)
  - 887th ESC – 1 Nov (MND-B)
  - 952d CSE – 2 NOV (underlap exists with backfill) (MND-C)
  - 618th EN CO (ESC) – 14 Nov (MND-N)
  - 15th EN CO (Horizontal) – 15 Nov (MND-N)
- **Coalition Force EOD capability:**
  - MND-CS has a 1.4b EOD PL
  - BiH EOD PL
  - US Navy EOD team

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 **Course of Action I: 8IA Engineer Company** 


- Send an engineer MiTT to 8IA to train up Iraqi Engineers.
  - 4-8 man team
  - 30-45 days of training Iraqis
  - Decision Point must be incorporated as to whether can execute the operation. CF engineers must be allocated as back stop.


**Course of Action II: CF Engineer Unit**

- CF engineers limited asset in theater with multiple operations competing for their time.
- Coalition Force engineers undergoing significant turnover in the next 90 days.

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**Joint Fires** 


- **Air Support**
  - **Missions**
    - Close Air Support for "Troops In Contact" (Battle drill priority)
    - Shows of Presence
    - Shows of Force } Possible "drive by"
    - Deliberate Planned Strike Targets (Prioritized with Corps Ops)
  - **Resources**
    - TCAP/JTAC with MND-C BN for Phase III
- **Ground Fires**
  - **Missions**
    - Counterfire
    - Support to Clearing operations
  - **Resources (24/7 capability)**
    - 2 x Paladin sections with associated Fire Direction and logistical SPT
    - 1 x Q36 Firefinder Radar
- **Electronic Warfare**
  - Comms EA prioritized IAW MNC-I CG priorities
- **Command and control**
  - MND-C C2 node controls US enablers
  - Clearance of fires


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Show of force/presence if preplanned don't need a JTAC.

Deliberate planning with the CAOC for missions may mitigate that fact that they are not Corps priority.

1.4b JTAC is the long term answer.

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**IO Concept of Support** 

Information Operations will support all phases of operations. During the first phase, IO will conduct mission planning, continue IPB, develop PSYOP products, coordinate and synchronize related IO assets & activities, locate and engage relevant key communicators, and develop local HVT listing & HVT Reward products.



**Phase II**  
O/O, IO will shape the information environment to promote the credibility of the GoI, discredit criminal elements using HVI Reward program and inform the local population of appropriate Rules of Engagement. IO will exploit positive actions of local ISF and BPT highlight negative aspects of adversarial actions such as inappropriate use of sensitive locations (mosques, schools, etc). Confirmed evidence of 1.4b to local criminal elements will be exploited.

**Phase III**  
IO will support cordon, clear and hold operations. Inform regional population of GoI/CF operations to eliminate criminal elements in an attempt to slow or disrupt potential reinforcement efforts, degrade enemy C2, exploit enemy misuse of culturally sensitive locations such as mosques, schools & hospitals and inform the population of successful removal and / or capture of criminals. IO will assist by exploiting and/or mitigating lethal operations efforts.


**Phase IV**  
In the final phase of the operation, IO will support development efforts, enhance GoI credibility and highlight the presence of the IA. Engagement will continue to persuade the population to support the GoI / ISF and help maintain a secure environment.

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<div><del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCF, IRAQ//MR</del></div> <div><b>IO Plan for Phantom Hammer</b><div></div></div>	
<div><b>Phase 1: IO Preparation</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MND-CS continues ongoing PSYOP</li><li>• HVI Reward product development</li><li>• MNC-I continues CII &amp; Counter-JAM operations</li><li>• CJSOTF/INTEL Ops</li><li>• Conduct IO related IBP<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-ID Key services</li><li>-Determine leadership C2 systems</li><li>-Find key communicators such as Clerics, mayor etc.</li><li>-Mosques, school and hospital locations &amp; usage</li><li>-Info realm; TV station, radio stations &amp; print media</li><li>-Identify key leaders for engagements</li></ul></li><li>• Coordinate Assets</li><li>• PSYOP product development</li></ul>	<div><b>Phase 3: Support Operations</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Exploit HVI Reward successes</li><li>• MNC-I continues CII &amp; Counter-JAM operations</li><li>• STO &amp; EW support lethal ops</li><li>• Key Leader Engagement continues</li><li>• Exploit criminal misuse of Mosques, schools &amp; hospitals</li></ul> <div><b>Phase 4: Support CMO</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Support PRT efforts during reconstruction</li><li>• Engage senior GoI leaders; development messages</li><li>• Frame realignment of forces as positive event, not retreat</li><li>• Highlight positive economic developments as GoI success</li></ul>
<div><b>Phase 2: Shaping</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 72 hour message vacuum</li><li>• Key Leadership Engagement local &amp; GoI</li><li>• PSYOP Shaping<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-GoI Credibility, Counter JAM &amp; ROE</li><li>-Lethal operations support GoI legitimacy</li><li>-GoI / CF target criminal elements preying on Iraqis</li></ul></li><li>• MNC-I continues CII &amp; JAM operations</li><li>• CJSOTF Operations</li><li>• EW Jamming (conditioning)</li><li>• Imposition of City Curfew</li><li>• Air Demonstrations; Show of Force</li><li>• Reward Program Exploitation</li></ul>	<div><b>Issues</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• IO efforts led by Corps during shaping operations to ensure synchronization</li><li>• IO plan is timeline driven but flexible, requiring key decision points to trigger events. Prior coordination is essential to success and would like 72 hour lead time notification to coordinate into CAOC ATO cycle</li><li>• Need visibility on current efforts in AO</li></ul>
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PMO 

- Police Training Teams (PTT)
  - May be TACON for use as QRF or equivalent for duration of operation IOT transition to IP development
  - May NOT be used for any type of detainee ops (guard, transport, etc); will not allow transition to IP development
- Detainee Operations
  - (b)(3), (b)(6)
  - Considerations
    - MNC-I will task in MNC-I FRAGO for additional C2X support (lesson from last op)
    - MND-CS needs to send request to C4 for detainee supplies...ie jump suits/flex cuffs
    - MND-CS responsible for detainee transport to Camp Cropper
  - Basic Detainee Guidelines
    - Ensure proper In-processing and tracking mechanisms in place
    - Detainees may only be held at DHA for 14 days beginning moment they are under CF control...can be extended up to 21 days
  - Contact MNC-I PMO for any processing/custodial care questions at DSN 

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	<del>SECRET//REL TO USA, MGFI, IRAQ//MR</del>	<b>PAO Guidance</b>	
<b>1. Background.</b>			
<p>This PAG provides PA guidance for Operation Phantom Hammer. The purpose of this operation is to neutralize Militant Jaysh Al Mahdi operating in the city of Diwaniyah, reestablish Iraqi Security Force control of Diwaniyah and to enhance security within the MND-CS's operational environment.</p>			
<p>On 2 July 07, a total of 81, 107mm rockets and mortars bombarded Camp Echo. Since April 2007, Diwaniyah has become a recruitment area for MJAM and a proving ground for new trainees. Local residents are intimidated by MJAM through death threats and murder.</p>			
<p>This PAG serves as a means of assisting U.S. government and military officials and Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) in event coordination and preparing the general theme and pitch for Operation Phantom Hammer. The information contained herein is intended for use by MNC-I/MSC commanders and appointed spokespersons when responding to or engaging with Western, Pan-Arab and Iraqi media. It includes messages/key themes and questions and answers.</p>			
<b>2. PA Posture.</b>			
<p>Posture: Passive in Phase I. Active posture will begin in Phase II of the (IV Phase) Operation. Phase II thru Phase IV requires a synchronized, strategic communication plan between Public Affairs and Information Operations that maximizes reporting of success and progress as well as counters inaccurate media reporting.</p>			
<b>3. Messages and Key Themes:</b>			
<b>Protecting the Populace</b>			
<p>Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces must provide security for the citizens of Diwaniyah and address local grievances.</p>			
<p>This operation is aimed at preventing MJAM from operating in Diwaniyah and continuing organized attacks on Coalition Forces. Inaction will allow</p>			
<p>MJAM and their influence to spread throughout the city.</p>			
<p>Neutralizing MJAM and restoring ISF control of Diwaniyah moves us closer to building a safer Iraq.</p>			
<b>Reestablish Stability of AD Diwaniyah</b>			
<p>The security situation in the city of Diwaniyah has become unstable due to MJAM retaining freedom of movement throughout 60% of Diwaniyah.</p>			
<p>MJAM are attempting to gain control of key parts of the city.</p>			
<p>Iraqi Security Forces, while continuing to build capacity, are the lead in this operation with support from Coalition</p>			
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## C6/G6/S6 Specified Tasks

**C6**

- Conduct a communication assessment at FOB Echo
- Determine if FOB Echo requires augmented comm support for the JOC
- Determine additional resources needed to properly C2 Coalition Forces and 8 IA Div
- Build a Signal enabler kit (laptops, radios, printers, fiber, VoIPs)

**MND-C**

- De-conflict frequency management issues
- Ensure the tasked Battalion has its own internal comm assets

**3<sup>rd</sup> Sig Bde**

- Ensure FOB Echo has comm infrastructure to properly support execution of Phantom Hammer

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**Enablers**

- Maneuver 2
  - Air Weapons Teams
  - Rotary wing lift assets
  - Civil Affairs
  - EOD
  - JIED
- Fires 3
  - Air Force (JTAC)
  - PSYOP
    - Combat Camera
  - Ground fires and radars
  - Electronic Warfare
- Sustainment 0
  - Area Support: 82<sup>nd</sup> Sustainment Brigade
    - All classes of supply
  - Medical support
- Intelligence 1
  - Interpreters
  - Interrogators
  - ISR
- Protection 1
  - Engineers / ISF engineers / contracted engineers
  - MP augmentation
    - Detention facility augmentation
  - CBRN
- Command and Control 1
  - Communications
  - Interagency liaison officers
  - Provincial Reconstruction Team Experts

- Which are required?
- What quantities
- Who controls them?
- Where will they reside?

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**Way Ahead**

- Do we have buy-in from IGFC, 8IA, MND-C, and MND-CS with current concept?
- Current COA:
  - Execute Phase III NET 15 Aug 07...maybe as late as 15 Sep?
    - MG Uthman will be "commander of commanders" (supported command) – this idea has been presented
    - Require division level plans NLT 10 Aug 07 from MND-C and MND-CS; (do we share them with IGFC to synchronize planning?)
  - When is the backbrief to CG, MNC-I
  - When is the combined rehearsal over CPOF?
- Issues that must be resolved:
  - Enabler support are contingent on the start of Phase III of this operation
  - IP
    - How will we proceed with Biometrics? (is Baqubah consuming all biometric resources?)
    - How will the IP be re-blued/trained? – MNSTC-I or MNC-I internal?
    - How will the IP leadership be vetted? – Need MOI involvement
  - Iraqi Army
    - Will additional battalions from 8IA be assigned to Diw
    - Need further IGFC engagement
  - Combat outpost location and construction
    - C7 support plan to reinforce TCP; build CSOPs


1.4c

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<p><b><i>C3 Air Staff Estimate for Phantom Hammer</i></b></p>					
ACTO	b (3), (b)(6)				
C3 Air Planner					
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## **Facts (CORPS CAB AWTs)**





### **AH-64 Utilization**



- **24** Total AH-64s, 36th Avn Bde
  - 2 DS to OCF-I (Annex P\*)
- **22**
  - 4 DS 1/3 BCT (Ramadi, flying from Balad)
- **18**
  - 4 DS MND-SE (Basra)
- **14**
  - 4 DS to ODA (Diwaniyah, flying from Balad)
- **10**
  - 4 DS to 25 ID (flying from Balad... evaluate 15 Aug)
- **6**
  - 6 Phase (3), Unscheduled Maint (3)
- **0** Remaining

\*6 Aft 'Big 3' being covered by MND-B/C

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<div>SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFH // 20170005</div> <div><div>CORPS CAB AWTs</div></div>	
<div><b>Facts</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Corps CAB has all AWTs committed</li><li>• Corps CAB cannot support both Hammer and already committed missions</li><li>• IOT support Hammer with AWT from Corp CAB, other missions will have to go unsupported</li><li>• FP issues at Echo and Kalsu</li></ul>	<div><b>Assumptions</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MND-C will be able to support Hammer without additional AWTs from Corps</li><li>• Maintenance/ bank time will not be affected for either Corps or Center</li><li>• AWTs in Ramadi, Basrah, ODA will remain in place</li><li>• MND-N support in place at least through 15 Aug</li><li>• CODEL / DV Surge = POO Coverage Surge</li><li>• AWTs will be able to support from home base</li></ul>
<div><b>Constraints</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Must support MND-N, Ramadi, Basra, OCF-I, ODA missions</li></ul>	<div><b>Risks</b></div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• AWTs will be at high risk if based out of Echo or Kalsu. (1 x 64 was damaged and had to be slung out 2 weeks ago from Kalsu, since then AWTs have supported on-going ODA missions in Diwa from home base at Balad)</li></ul>
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<div><div><del>SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCF // 20170006</del></div><div>CORPS CAB Lift / Assault</div><div></div></div>	
<b>Facts</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Corps is conducting RIPs, Sept is a heavy RIP season</li><li>▪ Air Assaults will have to be coordinated and de-conflicted with RIPs if Corps Assets are to be used</li><li>▪ Classes of supply can be lifted, must be de-conflicted with current RIP schedule</li><li>▪ CH-47s are for night ops only</li></ul>	<b>Assumptions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Center can support Lift / Assault missions</li><li>▪ Lift / Assault assets will be able to support out of home base</li><li>▪ Coordination with C4:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Most of the supply will come from Tallil and will be moved by GACs, this situation should not change</li><li>▪ If Lift is needed for supplies it would be on emergency basis</li></ul></li></ul>
<b>Constraints</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Corps Lift / Assault assets must support Theater RIPs</li></ul>	<b>Risks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Lift / Assault assets will be at high risk if based out of Echo or Kalsu.</li></ul>
<div><del>SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCF // 20170006</del></div>	



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(b)(6)

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